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93-1828 BRYANT v. HILL
Ballot access restrictions-Term limits.
Ruling below (U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Hill,
Ark SupCt, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349, 62
LW 2586):
Eligibility requirements placed by Arkansas on
incumbent U.S. senators and representatives that
restrict number of times they may appear on
ballot for re-election to their respective positions
violate Qualifications Clauses. Article 1, Sections
2 and 3.
Question presented: Does state have power un-
der Elections Clause, Article I, Section 4, Clause
1, to restrict incumbent candidate's access to
ballot in such manner, or do Qualifications
Clauses, Article 1. Section 2. Cf. 2, and Section 3,
Cl. 3, prohibit state from imposing such ballot
access restriction?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/16/94, by Win-
ston Bryant, Ark. Atty. Gen., Jeffrey A. Bell,
Dpty. Atty. Gen., and Ann Purvis, Asst. Atty.
Gen., and Griffin B. Bell, Paul J. Larkin Jr.,
Polly J. Price, King & Spalding, Cleta Deather-
age Mitchell, and Term Limits Legal Institute,
all of Washington, D.C.
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This case concerns the validity of
Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution, which
establishes limitations on the number of terms that
can be served by state constitutional officers, and
state legislators, and limitations on the eligibility of
candidates for the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of
Representatives to have their names placed on the
election ballot. Amendment 73 was proposed as an
initiated petition by the people of the State under
Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution and
approved in the General Election on November 3,
1992, by a vote of 494,326 to 330,836.
The proposal, as it appeared on the ballot
and was voted on at the General Election, read as
follows:
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT NO. 4
(Proposed by Petition of the People)
(Popular Name)
ARKANSAS TERM
AMENDMENT
LIMITATION
(Ballot Title)
An Amendment to the Constitution of the
State of Arkansas limiting the number of
terms that may be served by the elected
officials of the Executive Department of this
state to two (2) four-year terms, this
department to consist of a Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State,
Treasurer of State, Auditor of State,
Attorney General, Commissioner of State
Lands; limiting the number of terms that
may be served by members of the Arkansas
House of Representatives to three (3)
two-year terms, these members to be chosen
every second year; limiting the number of
terms that may be served by members of the
Arkansas Senate to two (2) four-year terms,
these members to be chosen every four
years; providing that any person having
been elected to three (3) or more terms as a
member of the United States House of
Representatives from Arkansas shall not be
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eligible to appear on the ballot for election
to the United States House of
Representatives from Arkansas; providing
that any person having been elected to two
(2) or more terms as a member for the
United States Senate from Arkansas shall
not be eligible to appear on the ballot for
election to the United States Senate from
Arkansas; providing for an effective date of
January 1, 1993; and making the provisions
applicable to all persons thereafter seeking
election to the specified offices.
FOR Proposed Constitutional Amendment
No. 4 [1
AGAINST Proposed Constitutional
Amendment No. 4 []
The text and description of the full Amendment
which were published and included in the initiative
petition but not on the ballot read:
SUMMARY:
This amendment provides a limit of
two (2) terms for the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of
State, Auditor of State, Attorney General
and Commissioner of State Lands. It
provides a limit of three (3) terms for State
Representatives, and a limit of two (2) terms
for State Senators. It also provides that
persons having been elected three (3) or
more terms as a member of the United
States House of Representatives from
Arkansas shall not be eligible to appear on
the ballot for election to the United States
House of Representatives from Arkansas.
Lastly, it provides that any person having
been elected to two (2) or more terms as a
member of the United States Senate from
Arkansas shall not be eligible to appear on
the ballot for election to the United States
Senate from Arkansas.
PREAMBLE:
The people of Arkansas find and
declare that elected officials who remain in
office too long become preoccupied with
reelection and ignore their duties as
representatives of the people. Entrenched
incumbency has reduced voter participation
and has led to an electoral system that is less
free, less competitive, and less
representative than the system established by
the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people
of Arkansas, exercising their reserved
powers, herein limit the terms of the elected
officials.
SECTION 1 - Executive Branch
(a) The Executive Department of the
State shall consist of a Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of
State, Auditor of State, Attorney General,
and Commissioner of State Lands, all of
whom shall keep their offices at the seat of
government, and hold their offices for the
term of four years, and until their successors
are elected and qualified.
(b) No elected officials of the
Executive Department of this State may
serve in the same office more than two such
four-year terms.
SECTION 2 - Legislative Branch
(a) The Arkansas House of
Representatives shall consist of members to
be chosen every second year by the qualified
electors of the several counties. No member
of the Arkansas House of Representatives
may serve more than three such two year
terms.
(b) The Arkansas Senate shall
consist of members to be chosen every four
years by the qualified electors of the several
districts. No member of the Arkansas Senate
may serve more than two such four-year
terms.
SECTION 3 Congressional Delegation
(a) Any person having been elected
to three or more terms as a member of the
United States House of Representatives from
Arkansas shall not be certified as a
candidate and shall not be eligible to have
his/her name placed on the ballot for
election to the United States House of
Representatives from Arkansas.
(b) Any person having been elected
to two or more terms as a member of the
United States Senate from Arkansas shall
not be certified as a candidate and shall not
be eligible to have his/her name placed on
the ballot for election to the United States
Senate from Arkansas.
SECTION 4 - Severability
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The provisions of this Amendment
are severable, and if any should be held
invalid, the remainder shall stand.
SECTION 5 - Provisions Self-Executing
Provisions of the Amendment shall
be self-executing.
SECTION 6 - Application
(a) This Amendment to the
Arkansas Constitution shall take effect and
be in operation on January 1, 1993, and its
provisions shall be applicable to all persons
thereafter seeking election to the offices
specified in this Amendment.
(b) All laws and constitutional
provisions which conflict with this
Amendment are hereby repealed to the
extent that they conflict with this
amendment.
The text of the entire Amendment was published
prior to the election as required by law. Ark. Const.
amend. 7. "Initiative;" Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-113
(1987).
On November 13, 1992, appellees Bobbie
Hill on behalf of herself and the League of Women
Voters of Arkansas filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment in Pulaski County Circuit Court seeking to
invalidate Amendment 73 on several grounds: (1) the
Amendment violates Article 1 of the U.S.
Constitution by adding an additional qualification for
election to the U.S. House of Representatives and
the U.S. Senate; (2) the sections of the Amendment
are inherently nonseverable and the
unconstitutionality of section 3 voids the entire
Amendment; (3) the Amendment did not contain an
Enacting Clause in violation of Amendment 7 of the
Arkansas Constitution.
The original defendants named in the
complaint were incumbent State constitutional
officers and legislators, U.S. senators and
representatives currently in office, the State
Democratic Party, the State Republican Party, and
the State Board of Election Commissioners. Many of
the incumbent State legislators combined their efforts
in this matter under the title of Unified Members.
Thereafter, other parties intervened. The State of
Arkansas through the State Attorney General's office
intervened as a party defendant and was joined by
various organizations that were proponents of the
Amendment: U.S. Term Limits, Inc., Arkansans for
Governmental Reform, and Americans for Term
Limits, as well as their representatives. An Amended
Complaint was subsequently filed adding Dick
Herget, a political supporter of U.S. Congressman
Ray Thornton, who has previously served three
terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, as a
party plaintiff. Plaintiff/appellee Bobbie Hill was
described as a political supporter of State
Representative John Dawson, who has previously
served seven terms in the State House of
Representatives.
Appellees Hill and Herget joined by U.S.
Congressman Ray Thornton and the State
Democratic Party moved for summary judgment to
void Amendment 73 in accordance with the
Amended Complaint. The Unified Members filed a
similar motion. The State of Arkansas and Arkansans
for Governmental Reform moved to Dismiss the
complaint for lack of justiciability. Intervenor U.S.
Term Limits moved for summary judgment on
grounds that Amendment 73 was valid in all
respects.
A hearing ensued on July 29, 1993, and the
circuit court handed down its Conclusions of Law
that same date which are summarized:
1. The matter is justiciable based on
the adverse impact of Amendment 73 on
incumbent officeholders and on appellees
Hill's and Herget's right to participate in the
political process.
2. The omission of an Enacting
Clause in the Amendment was a
fundamental error and fatal defect in the
Amendment.
3. Amendment 73 is a restriction on
the qualifications of persons seeking federal
congressional offices and violates the U.S.
Constitution.
4. The power to limit the terms of
State legislative and executive officers vests
with the people through a properly drafted
initiative.
5. The provisions applying term
limits to State officeholders were severable
and not inextricably linked to term limits on
the federal delegation.
A document entitled Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and a Final Order which
embraced the Conclusions of Law of July 29, 1993,
was entered on September 8, 1993. The principal
finding of fact on September 8, 1993, was that
Amendment 73 contained no Enacting Clause. For
that reason the court reiterated its conclusion that the
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Amendment failed to pass muster under the Arkansas
Constitution and declared it void. In the Final Order,
the court also ruled that Section 3 pertaining to U.S.
senators and representatives violated the
Qualifications clauses of the U.S. Constitution, but
that Section 3 was severable from Sections 1 and 2
which deal with state elected officeholders.
I. JUSTICIABILITY
Several appellants including U.S. Term
Limits, Inc., Arkansans for Governmental Reform,
the State of Arkansas, and Americans for Term
Limits contend on appeal that this matter is not
justiciable because appellees Hill and Herget and the
affected state and federal officeholders have not been
adversely impacted by Amendment 73 and, hence,
the case is not ripe for decision. Appellants'
justiciability argument hinges on the fact that no
elections have yet been held where state or federal
candidates have been excluded, and no rights to
association and speech in appellees Hill and Herget
at this juncture have been impaired. They urge that
Amendment 73 is prospective and, accordingly, only
terms of service after January 1, 1993, will be
counted for eligibility purposes. They maintain, in
short, that if past terms of service are counted, this
would be giving retroactive effect to Amendment 73.
Our law is clear that declaratory relief will
lie where (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) it
exists between parties with adverse interests; (3)
those seeking relief have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issues involved are ripe for
decision. UHS of Ark., Inc. v. City of Sherwood,
296 Ark. 97, 752 S.W.2d 36 (1988); Cummings v.
City of Fayetteville, 294 Ark. 151, 741 S.W.2d 638
(1987); Andres v. First Ark. Development Finance
Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97 (1959).
We have no problem concluding that
appellees Hill and Herget have standing to mount
this action for declaratory relief and that the case is
ripe for determination. Surely, the ability of Hill and
Herget to participate in the political process on
behalf of certain candidates and as voters for those
same candidates is in jeopardy which brings into play
impairment of speech and association rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 103 S.
Ct. 1564 (1983); Thorsted v. Gregoire, C93-770WD
(W.D.D.C. Wash. Feb. 10, 1994). The same holds
true for the League of Women Voters of Arkansas,
which has standing to participate on behalf of its
voter-members. Thorsted v. Gregoire, supra. For the
officeholders themselves, both state and federal, the
uncertainty over what the future holds is even more
daunting. Some officeholders do not know whether
they will be foreclosed from seeking election as early
as this election year.
A case and controversy rages among the
various parties to this action, including numerous
elected officials, over the effectiveness of
Amendment 73 and its application. It is a matter of
significant public interest, involving issues of
constitutional law. See Bryant v. English, 311 Ark.
187, 843 S.W.2d 21 (1992). Because of the
far-reaching impact of the issue and the potential for
an imminent impairment of the legitimate interests of
elected officeholders and their supporters occasioned
by the Amendment, the matter is ripe for
adjudication and justiciable.
H1. ENACTING CLAUSE
We turn next to the facet of this case on
which the circuit court predicated its decision -- the
absence of an Enacting Clause in Amendment 73.
Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution sets the
following requirement:
Enacting Clause The style of all
the bills initiated and submitted under the
provisions of this section shall be, "Be It
Enacted by the People of the State of
Arkansas" (municipality, or county as the
case may be). In submitting measures to the
people, the Secretary of State and all other
officials shall be guided by the general
election laws or municipal laws, as the case
may be, until additional legislation is
provided there for.
The circuit court found that the omission of
the Enacting Clause was fatal to Amendment 73 and
voided it on that basis.
The appellants vehemently attack this ruling
on several grounds: (1) appellees Hill and Herget
waged, in essence, a contest over the sufficiency of
the initiated petition with their Enacting Clause
argument, and the circuit court had no jurisdiction
over sufficiency matters; (2) Amendment 7 speaks of
the style of all "bills" needing Enacting Clauses, and
"bills" is a legislative term which does not include
constitutional amendments; (3) the requirements of
Amendment 7 are directory post-election and not
mandatory; and (4) there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of Amendment 7.
We believe that the declaratory judgment
action which raised the Enacting Clause issue and the
validity of Amendment 73, post-election, was
appropriately before the circuit court and that that
court had jurisdiction to hear the matter. We,
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therefore, turn to the language of Amendment 7
itself.
Under the title "Initiative," Amendment 7
reads:
The first power reserved by the people is
the initiative. Eight percent of the legal
voters may propose any law and ten percent
may propose a Constitutional Amendment
by initiative petition, and every such petition
shall include the full text of the measure so
proposed. (Emphasis ours.)
The people of this State may propose either laws or
constitutional amendments by initiative petition. The
lawmaking power given to the people to propose and
adopt laws by initiative petition was intended to
supplement existing legislative authority in the
General Assembly. See Ferrill v. Keel, 105 Ark.
380, 151 S.W. 269 (1912). That power, though, is
not what is involved in the case before us. Here, we
are concerned with an initiative petition to amend the
Arkansas Constitution, which is a separate matter
altogether.
In common legal parlance, a "bill" is a draft
of an act of the legislature before it becomes law.
Black's Law Dictionary 167 (6th ed. 1991). Under
Amendment 7, the people of this State have the
power to enact "bills" into laws by direct vote. The
term "bills" as used in the Enacting Clause section of
Amendment 7 does not refer to statewide
constitutional amendments but only to initiated
proposals where the people are seeking to enact their
own laws. Our case law recognizes that Amendment
7 requires an Enacting Clause for initiated bills by
the people. Hailey v. Carter, 221 Ark. 20, 251
S.W.2d 826 (1952). That is because the people, as
opposed to the General Assembly, are enacting the
laws under their initiative power. But, again, the
same does not hold true for constitutional
amendments. We are aware of no case in Arkansas
holding that an Enacting Clause is required for a
proposed statewide constitutional amendment.
The circuit court failed to make this
distinction, but the Enacting Clause provision makes
it clear by referring to bills. In the case before us,
Amendment 73 was published as required by law and
adopted by a wide majority of those voting on the
issue. The ballot title stated that it was "Proposed by
Petition of the People." It was abundantly clear that
this was a proposed amendment to the Arkansas
Constitution to put term limits into effect.
In sum, Amendment 7 makes no requirement
for an enacting clause for statewide initiated petitions
to amend the Arkansas Constitution, and we so hold.
We reverse the circuit court on this point.
III. QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSE
We next address the issue of whether the
State of Arkansas can render certain incumbent U.S.
senators and representatives ineligible to appear on
the ballot for their respective positions. We conclude
that such a restriction on eligibility to stand for
election to the U.S. Congress is violative of the
respective Qualification clauses of Article 1 of the
U.S. Constitution. Those clauses read:
§ 2. House of representatives.
[2.] No person shall be a
representative who shall not have attained to
the age of twenty-five years, and been seven
years a citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of
that state in which he shall be chosen.
§ 3. Senate.
[3.] No person shall be a senator
who shall not have attained to the age of
thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an inhabitant of the state for
which he shall be chosen.
U.S. Const. art 1, § 2, cl. 2 and § 3, cl. 3.
The parties in this case have taken
considerable pains to educate this court on the
history of the respective Qualification clauses and the
original intent of the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. We find the history to be helpful but
inconclusive regarding the issue at hand. We can
glean from the history that a provision to require the
rotation, as it was called, of senators and
representatives was discussed and debated and
ultimately discarded at the Constitutional Convention
as a formal provision of the U.S. Constitution. C.
Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1928). No
doubt that evinces a decision on the part of the
framers not to mandate rotation, or term limits. At
the same time, whether the states are foreclosed from
adding a restriction to candidacy in the form of
service limitations is not specifically addressed.
Under the previous Articles of Confederation,
individual states had this authority, and delegates to
Congress were limited to a term of three years. Art.
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Conf. V (1777). The framers of the U.S.
Constitution did not expressly endow the states with
this same authority. Indeed, the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 defeated a proposal for the states
to set property qualifications for service in Congress.
C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 418
(1928).
The ultimate document proposed by the
framers and ratified by the states as the U.S.
Constitution enumerated three benchmarks for
congressional service -- age, citizenship, and
residency. No other qualifications were included.
When the House of Representatives attempted to add
one more by refusing to seat one of its own members
in 1967, Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, for wrongfully
diverting federal funds to himself, his wife, and
staff, the United States Supreme Court scuttled the
effort. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 23 L.
Ed. 2d 491, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969). In doing so, the
Court quoted Alexander Hamilton, who was
answering an antifederalist charge during the
ratification process that the proposed U.S.
Constitution favored the wealthy and propertied
interests:
The truth is that there is no method of
securing to the rich the preference
apprehended but by prescribing
qualifications of property either for those
who may elect or be elected. But this forms
no part of the power to be conferred upon
the national government. Its authority would
be expressly restricted to the regulation of
the times, the places, the manner of
elections. The qualifications of the persons
who may choose or be chosen, as has been
remarked upon other occasions, are defined
and fixed in the Constitution, and are
unalterable by the legislature. The Federalist
Papers 371 (Mentor ed 1961). Emphasis in
last sentence added.)
395 U.S. at 539.
The Legislature referenced by Hamilton was
the Congress, but it is his allusion to the fixed and
immutable character of the enumerated qualifications
that is illuminating today. In that same decision,
Powell v. McCormack, the Court made mention of
a Report by the House Committee on Elections
regarding the eligibility of William McCreery to sit
in Congress. The issue concerned an additional
residency requirement imposed by the State of
Maryland that disqualified him. That Report clearly
and specifically determined that the U.S.
Constitution reserved no authority in the State
legislatures to change, add to, or diminish the
qualifications set forth in Article 1. 395 U.S. at
542-543, citing 17 Annals of Cong. 871-872 (1807).
Qualifications set out in the U.S.
Constitution, unalterable except by amendment to
that document, is a conclusion that makes eminently
good sense. If there is one watchword for
representation of the various states in Congress, it is
uniformity. Federal legislators speak to national
issues that affect the citizens of every state.
Additional age restrictions, residency requirements,
or sundry experience criteria established by the states
would cause variances in this uniformity and lead to
an imbalance among the states with respect to who
can sit in Congress. This is precisely what we
believe the drafters of the U.S. Constitution intended
to avoid. The uniformity in qualifications mandated
in Article 1 provides the tenor and the fabric for
representation in the Congress. Piecemeal restrictions
by state would fly in the face of that order.
The appellants raise a corollary argument.
They urge that Amendment 73 is merely a ballot
access amendment and not a mandate establishing an
additional qualification. No doubt some effort was
made by the drafters of Amendment 73 to couch it in
terms of eligibility "to appear on the ballot" rather
than as a disqualification. And organizing and
overseeing the time, place, and manner of elections
clearly falls within the province of the states under
the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. art 1, § 4.
Provisions, for example, requiring state officials to
resign before running for federal office have been
upheld as merely falling within the general power of
the states to regulate federal elections. See, e.g.,
Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L. Ed. 2d 698, 104 S.
Ct. 509 (1983).
This effort to dress eligibility to stand for
Congress in ballot access clothing, that is, as a
regulatory measure falling within the State's ambit
under Article 1, § 4, is not without some rational
appeal. We do not agree, however, that excluding a
broad category of persons from seeking election to
Congress is a mere exercise of regulatory power.
The intent and the effect of Amendment 73 are to
disqualify congressional incumbents from further
service. We do recognize that an ineligible
congressman under Amendment 73 is not totally
disqualified and might run as a write-in candidate for
Congress or receive a gubernatorial appointment to
fill a vacancy in the same body. Following this
thread, the appellants posit that term limitations do
not mean disqualification -- only ineligibility to be
placed on the ballot as a candidate for certain
offices. These glimmers of opportunity for those
disqualified, though, are faint indeed -- so faint in
our judgment that they cannot salvage Amendment
73 from constitutional attack. See Thorsted v.
Gregoire, C93-770WD (W.D.D.C. Wash. Feb. 10,
1994).
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An additional qualification has been added to
congressional eligibility. The list now reads age,
nationality, residency, and prior service. Term
limitations for congressional representation may well
have come of age. But to institute such a change, an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution is required,
ratified by three-fourths of the states. U.S. Const. art
5. In sum, the Qualification clauses fix the sole
requirements for congressional service. This is not a
power left to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
The attempt to add an additional criterion based on
length of service is in direct conflict with the
Qualification clauses, and the Supremacy Clause
pertains. Section 3 is stricken from Amendment 73.
IV. SEVERABILITY
Because we strike down Section 3 of
Amendment 73, we must now address the issue of
whether this jeopardizes the entire Amendment. The
argument is made by the Unified Members that it
does because the provisions relating to federal
legislators and to state officeholders and legislators
are inextricably linked irrespective of the presence of
a severability clause in the Amendment. The Unified
Members further stress that Amendment 73 was
packaged as one plan.
Section 4 of the Amendment reads: "The
provisions of this Amendment are severable, and if
any should be held invalid, the remainder shall
stand." The circuit court ruled on this issue twice. In
its first opinion dated July 29, 1993, this conclusion
was reached:
Section 3, of the term limit
amendment which is the constitutionally
invalid provision is linked to state term
limits on (sic) only in theme, a theme that
the voters overwhelmingly approved by
initiative. To hold that the provisions are
"inextricably linked" per the analysis in
Hasha' this Court would have to conclude
that the voters dislike for the federal
delegation was overwhelming to the extent
that they forced term limits upon state
officials, an analysis that this Court cannot
make.
Later, in its Final Order of September 8,
1993, the court ruled:
5. Sections 1 and 2 of Amendment
73 are not invalid because they were
combined with unconstitutional limits on
United States Senators and Representatives.
6. The court cannot conclude that
the voter's dislike for incumbent United
States Senators and Representatives was
overwhelming to the extent that it caused
voters to impose state limits on officers,
senators and representatives.
7. Sections 1 and 2 of Amendment
73 are severable from Section 3 pursuant to
the severability clause in Section 6 thereof.
Our cases over the years have been
consistent in examining the severability issue. In
determining whether the invalidity of part of the act
is fatal to the entire legislation, we have looked to 1)
whether a single purpose is meant to be
accomplished by the act; and 2) whether the sections
of the act are interrelated and dependent upon each
other. Borchert v. Scott, 248 Ark. 1041, 248 Ark.
1050, 460 S.W.2d 28-H, 460 S.W.2d 28 (1970)
(supplemental opinion on rehearing); Faubus v.
Kinney, 239 Ark. 443, 389 S.W.2d 887 (1965);
Nixon v. Allen, 150 Ark. 244, 234 S.W. 45 (1921);
Cotham v. Coffman, 111 Ark. 108, 163 S.W. 1183
(1914). In Faubus v. Kinney, we noted that it is
important whether the portion of the act remaining is
complete in itself and capable of being executed
wholly independent of that which was rejected.
Clearly, when portions of an act are mutually
connected and interwoven, severance is not
appropriate. Wenderoth v. City of Ft. Smith, 251
Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971).
The presence of a severability clause is a
factor to be considered but, by itself, it may not be
determinative. In Combs v. Glen Falls Insur. Co.,
237 Ark. 745, 375 S.W.2d 809 (1964), we stated
that a severability clause may be an aid to the courts
in construction of a statute but in the words of
Justice Brandeis, it is not "an inexorable command."
237 Ark. at 748, 375 S.W.2d at 810, citing Dorchy
v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 68 L. Ed. 686, 44 S. Ct.
323 (1924). In Combs, we concluded that the clause
could not salvage the act of the General Assembly in
question, and we voided the entire act.
Recent authority indicates that other
jurisdictions subscribe to the same basic principles
for determining severability as we in Arkansas. See
Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937
(9th Cir. 1993); Gerken v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n, 6 Cal. 4th 707, 863 P.2d 694 (Cal. 1993);
Legislature of the State of California v. Eu, 54 Cal.
3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal.
1991), cert. denied, 117 L. Ed. 2d 516, 112 S.Ct.
1292, 112 S. Ct. 1293 (1992). In Brown, the Ninth
Circuit focused on whether the unconstitutional
portion of the act was functionally independent and,
secondly, on whether the Congress would have
enacted the law without the unconstitutional
provision. In Legislature of the State of California v.
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Eu, the California Supreme Court proposed a test
with three facets for severability -- whether the
invalid portion of the measure was grammatically,
functionally, and volitionally separable from the
remainder. By volitionally separable, the court meant
whether the people would have voted for it
independent of the invalid provisions. The court in
Eu considered the severability of a void provision in
a constitutional amendment establishing term limits.
It declared the clause in the amendment relating to
restrictions on pensions for incumbent legislators to
be unconstitutional but held it to be severable and
upheld the balance of the amendment fixing term
limits.
A reading of Sections 1, 2, and 3 of
Amendment 73 shows that they are grammatically
independent and functionally independent. The
question then remains whether the Arkansas voters
would have adopted Sections 1 and 2 relating to
State officeholders and legislators in the absence of
Section 3 which applies to U.S. senators and
representatives. We believe that the circuit court was
correct in concluding that what the people voted for
in adopting Amendment 73 was a theme or concept
-- the limitation of service terms for persons in
public office. The fact that one category of persons
is eliminated from that adopted Amendment does not
mean that the voters did not intend it to apply to the
remaining two categories. Nor do we consider term
limits on federal legislators to be the bait which
enticed voters to vote aye on the amendment as a
whole. There is nothing to suggest that this was the
case. In short, we are confident that Amendment 73
would have passed even without the inclusion of
Section 3 in that the majority was voting for a
concept -- the limitation of public service terms.
We further disagree that Hasha v. City of
Fayetteville, supra, controls this case. In Hasha, the
issue was the placement of an invalid proposal for $
10 million in public school bonds on the same ballot
with a proposal for a 20-year one percent sales and
use tax to secure capital improvement bonds,
including the school bonds. We held that the two
proposals were inextricably linked, and we stated:
A voter who wished to vote for the issuance
of the $10,000,000 in bonds for the school
district knew that he or she was required to
also vote in favor of the tax because,
without the tax, the bonds could not be
issued. It is abundantly clear that the
proposal for the issuance of the bonds for
the construction of the school facilities was
popular with the voters.
311 Ark. at 469, 845 S.W.2d at 505.
That is not the situation with Amendment
73. The common theme of term limitations applies
equally to all three categories of elected
officeholders. In Hasha, the public school bonds
were categorically different from the sales and use
tax and from the other capital improvement bonds.
The school bonds provided an obvious lure to assure
a favorable vote on the tax proposal. Here, there is
nothing before us to indicate that the voting public
sought to limit one category of elected official more
so than another.
The remaining sections of Amendment 73
can stand independently without the presence of
Section 3. There is nothing to suggest that the voters
intended Sections 1, 2, and 3 to be dependent on one
another so that if one section failed, the other
sections failed also. The balance of Amendment 73
is valid.
V. STATE OFFICEHOLDERS
We next examine the constitutionality of
Sections 1 and 2 of Amendment 73 relating to term
limits on State executive and legislative
officeholders. The circuit court, though it invalidated
the entire amendment for lack of an Enacting Clause,
ruled that Sections I and 2 do not violate the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.
We concur with this ruling. Individual states
have limited the terms of their officeholders for
decades, albeit more in the context of their
governors than their legislators. See Miyazawa v.
City of Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816, 821 (S.D.
Ohio 1993). In the case before us, the policy and
interest of the State of Arkansas was expressed in the
Preamble to Amendment 73:
The people of Arkansas find and
declare that elected officials who remain in
office too long become preoccupied with
reelection and ignore their duties as
representatives of the people. Entrenched
incumbency has reduced voter participation
and has led to an electoral system that is less
free, less competitive, and less
representative than the system established by
the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people
Of Arkansas, exercising their reserved
powers, herein limit the terms of elected
officials.
In counterpoint to the State's interest, as expressed
by the adoption of Amendment 73, are the interests
of current State officeholders and their supporters
such as appellee Hill. We have already referred in
this opinion to those legitimate interests in the
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political process which are protected under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The United States Supreme Court has made
it clear that the right to candidacy is not a
fundamental right requiring close scrutiny. Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 92 S. Ct.
849 (1972); see also Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S.
957, 73 L. Ed. 2d 508, 102 S. Ct. 2836 (1982)
(plurality decision). A second question, though, is
whether the right of a person such as appellee Hill to
participate in a person's political campaign or to vote
for a candidate is fundamental in nature so as to
warrant a compelling state interest to offset it.
Separating the rights of the candidate from those of
the supporter may be difficult. The Court observed
in 1992 that "the rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat
separation." Burdick v. Takushi, 119 L. Ed. 2d 245,
112 S.Ct. 2059, 2065-2066 (1992), quoting Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 92
S. Ct. 849 (1972).
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983), the Court
weighed the speech and association interests of
voters for and supporters of John Anderson, an
independent candidate for president of the United
States, against the State of Ohio's asserted interest in
protecting political stability by setting an early filing
deadline. The Court held that the supporters'
interests unquestionably outweighed the State's
regulatory interests. The proper standard for
resolving the assessment of the State's interest and
the burden on supporters has since been described
"as a more flexible standard" dependent on the
severity of the burden. Burdick v. Takushi, 119 L.
Ed. 2d 245, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992). However,
not every burden on the right to vote is subject to
strict scrutiny or requires a compelling state interest
to justify it. Id.
The California Supreme Court, in the wake
of the Anderson case, considered the effect of a
constitutional amendment fixing term limits on
elected state officials. Legislature of the State of
California v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,
286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 117 L.
Ed. 2d 516, 112 S.Ct. 1292, 112 S. Ct. 1293
(1992). That Court weighed the interests of the
voters and supporters of certain candidates against
the will of the electorate limiting incumbent terms
and held that the amendment would prevail
irrespective of whether a rational basis standard or a
compelling state interest standard was employed. The
Court stated:
In sum, it would be anomalous to
hold that a statewide initiative measure
aimed at "restoring a free and democratic
system of fair elections," and "encouraging
qualified candidates to seek public office"
(Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5), is invalid as an
unwarranted infringement of the rights to
vote and to seek public office. We conclude
the legitimate and compelling interests set
forth in the measure outweigh the narrower
interests of petitioner legislators and the
constituents who wish to perpetuate their
incumbency.
816 P.2d at 1329.
It is not the function of this court to agree or
disagree with the purpose and rationale behind
Amendment 73. It is our function to determine
whether the Amendment expresses such a legitimate
and sufficient state interest that the rights of the
supporters and the incumbents must yield. We hold
that the state interest, as expressed in the Preamble
to Amendment 73, is sufficiently rational and even
compelling when weighed against the residual burden
placed on the rights and privileges of elected
officeholders and those desiring to support them.
VI. TERMS OF SERVICE COUNTED
Because we hold that Sections 1 and 2 of
Amendment 73 are severable and valid, we must
determine when the terms of service by State
officeholders are counted for purposes of
disqualification. Appellant Americans for Term
Limits as well as appellees Hill and Herget contend
as part of their justiciability arguments that
Amendment 73 is retroactive in its effect and that
terms of service prior to the Amendment's effective
date of January 1, 1993, should be counted for
disqualification purposes. Other appellants, including
the State of Arkansas and U.S. Term Limits, Inc.,
argue that only terms of service after the effective
date of the Amendment are to be counted. The effect
of counting terms of service after January 1, 1993,
would be that State executive officers and senators
would not be ineligible for another eight years (two
four-year terms) and that State representatives would
not be ineligible for another six years (three two-year
terms). Conversely, by counting prior terms of
service, any State executive officer or senator having
previously served two terms and any State
representative having previously served three terms
is disqualified.
In reviewing several of the term limitations
amendments adopted in other states, we note where
the amendments either provide a date certain from
which terms will be counted or, alternatively,
provide for ineligibility based on a fixed number of
years served:
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- State of Washington. Wash. Rev. Code §
29.15.240 (Supp. 1993) (no terms served before
November 3, 1992, may be used to determine
eligibility to appear on the ballot) (approved Nov. 3,
1992).
- State of California. Cal. Const. art. XX, § 7
(applies to terms of state constitutional officers and
legislators where the official was elected or
appointed to the office after November 6, 1990)
(adopted Nov. 6, 1990).
- State of California. Cal. Elections Code § 25003
(Deering Supp. 1993) (terms of office in Congress
prior to January 1, 1993, shall not be counted)
(approved Nov. 3, 1992).
State of Colorado. Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 9a
(applies to terms of office in Congress beginning on
or after January 1, 1991) (approved Nov. 6, 1992).
- State of Wyoming. Wyo. Stat. §§ 22-5-103,
22-5-104 (1992) (terms of service in state offices and
in Congress prior to January 1, 1993, shall not be
counted) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
- State of Florida. Fla. Const. art. 6, § 4 (no person
may appear on ballot for state or federal office if by
end of current term in office, the person will have
served in that same office for eight consecutive
years) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
State of North Dakota. N.D. Cent. Code §
16.1-01-13.1 (Supp. 1993) (person ineligible for
Congress if by the start of the term for which
election is being held that person has served at least
twelve years) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
State of Oklahoma. Okla. Const. art 5, § 17A
(member of Legislature elected after effective date of
amendment eligible to serve 12 additional years)
(approved Sept. 18, 1990).
- State of Ohio. Ohio Const. art. V, § 8 (terms
beginning on or after January 1, 1993, shall be
considered for eligibility to the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
Amendment 73 does not expressly provide a separate
benchmark date after which terms of service will be
counted.
To resolve the question of when to count
terms, we turn to the measure itself. In doing so, we
construe constitutional amendments liberally to
accomplish their purposes. Porter v. McCuen, 310
Ark. 674, 839 S.W.2d 521 (1992). We will not give
a strained construction contrary to the spirit and
purpose of the amendment as expressed by the
people. Thompson v. Younts, 282 Ark. 524, 669
S.W.2d 471 (1984). Amendment 73 contains an
effective date and states that none of the State elected
officials, whether executive or legislative, may serve
more than the specified number of terms. It further
proclaims that it is "applicable to all persons
thereafter seeking election." However, it is simply
not clear on when counting the terms must
commence.
Constitutional amendments operate
prospectively unless the language used or the
purpose of the provision indicates otherwise.
Drennen v. Bennett, 230 Ark. 330, 322 S.W.2d 585
(1959). We have also held that with respect to an
amendatory act the legislation will not be construed
as retroactive when it may be reasonably construed
otherwise. Lucas v. Handcock, 266 Ark. 142, 583
S.W.2d 491 (1979); see also Gannett River States
Publishing Co. v. Arkansas Indus. Dev. Comm'n,
303 Ark. 684, 799 S.W.2d 543 (1990). The same
rule of construction is equally applicable to a
constitutional amendment. The Amendment in this
case is vague and ambiguous on the point of when to
begin counting terms. As already stated, two
proponents of the Amendment, U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. and the State of Arkansas represented by the
Attorney General's office, interpret it to apply
prospectively. Arkansans for Governmental Reform
took the same position before the circuit court.
Because of the vagueness in the Amendment on this
point, we agree. Only periods of service
commencing on or after January 1, 1993, will be
counted as a term for limitation purposes under
Amendment 73.
A mandate will issue in this case on March
14, 1994. Any petition for rehearing shall be filed no
later than March 9, 1994. Any response shall be
filed no later than March 11, 1994.
ENDNOTE
1. Hasha v. City of Fayetteville, 311 Ark. 460, 845 S.W.2d
500 (1993).
Special Justices Ernie Wright and Carl
McSpadden join in this opinion.
Dudley and Hays, JJ., and Special Chief
Justice George K. Cracraft and Special Justice
Gerald P. Brown concur in part and dissent in part.
Holt, C.J., and Newbern, Glaze and Corbin,
JJ., not participating.
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CONCUR BY: GEORGE K. CRACRAFT (In Part);
STEELE HAYS (In Part); ROBERT H. DUDLEY
(In Part); GERALD P. BROWN (In Part)
DISSENT BY: GEORGE K. CRACRAFT (In Part);
STEELE HAYS (In Part); ROBERT H. DUDLEY
(In Part); GERALD P. BROWN (In Part)
CONCURRING IN PART; DISSENTING IN
PART. GEORGE K. CRACRAIFT, Special Chief
Justice
I concur with the results reached in the
majority opinion on the issues of justiciability, the
enacting clause, the constitutionality of limitations on
state elected officials, severability, and terms of
service to be counted. I cannot, however, agree that
the restrictions on members of the United States
Congress violate the Qualifications Clauses of Article
I, Sections 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution.
I do not view the provisions of Amendment 73 to the
Arkansas Constitution as raising a "qualifications"
issue, but rather a ballot access issue to be measured
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
Unlike Sections 1 and 2 of Amendment 73
(which apply to state elected officials), Section 3
(which applies to members of Congress) does not
impose an absolute bar on incumbent succession.
Instead, Section 3 merely makes it more difficult for
an incumbent to be elected. Under our liberal
write-in laws, an incumbent can be elected to
congressional office and, if elected, serve the term
for which elected. An incumbent United States
Representative or Senator can also serve in the
Congress under appointment to fulfill an unexpired
term. In neither case would his or her qualifications
to serve be in anywise affected by Amendment 73.
In my view, a person is qualified within the meaning
of Article I of the United States Constitution if
permitted to serve if elected. While an incumbent
congressional candidate's ballot access is limited, his
or her qualifications to serve if elected to Congress
are not affected.
The United States Supreme Court has never
squarely faced this issue. However, two United
States Courts of Appeals have recognized the
distinction I would make between ballot access
restrictions and those qualifications mentioned in
Article I, and I find their decisions persuasive. See
Hopfmann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1984),
vacated in part on other grounds, 471 U.S. 459
(1985), and Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th
Cir. 1983). In Hopfmann, the court stated:
Plaintiffs next argue that the
application of the 15 per cent rule
[restricting which candidates' names would
appear on the Democratic primary ballot to
those who received at least 15 percent of the
vote at the party's convention] transgresses
Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 of the
Constitution in that it unlawfully adds a
qualification for the office of United States
Senator beyond the age, citizenship and
residency requirements of the Constitution.
As the defendants have correctly pointed
out, the 15 percent rule does not add a qualification
that precludes Hopfmann from obtaining the office of
United States Senator. The rule merely adds a
restriction on who may run in the Democratic party
primary for statewide political office and potentially
become the party nominee. The cases cited by
plaintiffs to the effect that neither Congress nor the
states can add to the constitutional qualifications for
office are inapposite. Cf. Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 547, 551, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1977, 1979,
23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969).
Unlike the additional requirements involved
in the cases cited by plaintiffs, failure to comply with
the 15 percent rule does not render a candidate
ineligible for the office of United States Senator. An
individual is free to run as the candidate of another
party, as an independent, or as a write-in candidate.
If he is elected and meets the requirements of Article
I, Section 3, he will be qualified to take office. As
the Wyoming Supreme Court stated in State v.
Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864, 871 (Wyo.
1948), the test to determine whether or not the
"restriction" amounts to a "qualification" within the
meaning of Article I, Section 3, is whether the
candidate "could be elected if his name were written
in by a sufficient number of electors." 746 F.2d at
102-03 (emphasis added).
In my view, the Qualifications Clauses
protect only the right of a person who meets the
qualifications of age, citizenship, and residency to be
seated in the Congress if elected. They do not
address the right of any person to seek election or
that of his constituents to vote for the person of their
choice. Indeed, the Qualifications Clauses themselves
begin with the phrase "no person shall be" a
representative or senator, a choice of words that, to
my mind, clearly demonstrates that the Qualifications
Clauses are addressed to service in the Congress.
The rights to seek election and to vote for the
candidate of one's choice are afforded the protection
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments against
ballot access restrictions that are too severe when
measured by the balancing test set out in Anderson
v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 103
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S. Ct. 1564 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 119 L.
Ed. 2d 245, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2059 (1992). Nor
should the odds for or against the successful waging
of a write-in campaign lead to the conclusion that
Section 3 of Amendment 73 is a "qualification" in
"ballot access clothes." Rather, such odds should be
merely one factor considered along with all others in
the balancing process which pits candidates' and
voters' rights against the state's interest in fair and
open elections, free of perceived evils of entrenched
incumbency.
In our deliberations, we have applied that
balancing test to Sections 1 and 2 of Amendment 73
and found that the state's interest in preventing the
perceived evils outweighs the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of state level candidates and
voters therefor. In my opinion, since we have
decided that Amendment 73's lifetime bar on state
level incumbents passes Fourteenth Amendment
muster, it must necessarily follow that the less
stringent restrictions placed on members of Congress
easily pass this same test.
I would hold that Amendment 73 to the
Arkansas Constitution was proposed and adopted in
the manner provided by law, is not constitutionally
infirm in any respect, and is valid and enforceable in
its entirety.
CONCURRING IN PART; DISSENTING IN
PART.
STEELE HAYS, Associate Justice
Although I agree with today's decision
upholding term limits upon state officeholders and
severing that part of Amendment 73, I disagree with
the holding of the majority that the eligibility
restriction upon United States senators and
representatives is unconstitutional. I start from the
premise that all political authority resides in the
people, limited only by those provisions of the
federal or state constitutions specifically to the
contrary. In this instance the people of Arkansas
have spoken, prudently or otherwise, in the most
direct means available to them- an initiated
amendment to their state constitution. That
expression should not be denied them except on clear
and compelling grounds. Such grounds have not been
demonstrated to my satisfaction.
The people of each state possess all powers
which are not expressly or impliedly delegated to the
federal government or which they are not prohibited
from exercising by the United States Constitution.
U.S. Const. amend. 10. See State v. Nichols, 26
Ark. 74 (1870). Further, we must presume the
amendment is constitutional, and all doubts must be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality if it is
possible to do so. Fayetteville School Dist. v.
Arkansas State Bd. of Education, 313 Ark. 1, 852
S.W.2d 122 (1993); Gazaway v. Greene County
Equalization Board, 314 Ark. 569, 864 S.W.2d 233
(1993). Accordingly, if a provision of the
amendment is not clearly prohibited, we are obliged
to construe it as constitutional.
I find the United States Constitution does not
prohibit additional qualifications for senators and
representatives. The Qualification Clauses of Article
1 of the Constitution simply provide: "No person
shall be a representative [senator] who shall not
have. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) This language
indicates the qualifications are to be the minimum
requirements rather than the exclusive requirements.
I see it as significant that the Constitution provides:
"the electors in each state shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the state legislature." Art. 1, §
2, cl. 1. This provision contemplates allowing a state
to require an elector to have attained the age of
thirty years.' It seems clear the framers intended to
prevent a person under the age of twenty-five years
from being elected to the House of Representatives,
but, if a state required electors to be at least thirty
years of age, it is implausible to conclude the state
would be required to allow a person to run for office
who could not vote. Since the framers determined
that the people of each state could establish
requirements for their electors, it stands to reason
that the qualifications in Article 1 are minimum
requirements. In sum, the framers intended merely
to insure that no state lowered the standards for
being elected to the House of Representatives or
Senate.
The majority states that the history
surrounding the drafting of the Constitution is
inconclusive, yet they rely upon that history as
discussed in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
23 L. Ed. 2d 491, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969). In Powell,
the Court held the House of Representatives could
not exclude Congressman Powell, a duly elected
member of Congress, for any reason other than the
qualifications set forth in the Constitution. In so
holding, the Court examined the debates surrounding
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution itself.
While it is clear that the framers discussed term
limits, I am not convinced that the failure to include
term limits in the Constitution prohibits the people of
the states from enacting term limits.
The only "intent" that can be ascertained
from the framers' exclusion of term limits is that the
delegates considered it undesirable to impose a
uniform tenure limitation upon the representatives of
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every state. However, this does not confirm that the
people of each state are prohibited from enacting
term limits. Even the majority recognizes that
whether the States are foreclosed from adding a
restriction to candidacy is not specifically addressed
in the Constitution or the historical debates.
Nevertheless, the majority places emphasis upon the
historical debates and Alexander Hamilton's
"allusion to the fixed and immutable character of the
enumerated qualifications. "
Justice Holmes observed that government is
an experiment. The people are the conductors of that
endless experiment and have the right to tinker with
it as they choose, free of unwarranted interference.
Although it may make "eminently good sense" to
have uniform qualifications for federal legislators in
order to prevent an "imbalance among the states," I
submit the drafters of the Constitution intended
merely to establish uniform minimum qualifications.
Nor can I agree that the effective date of the
amendment for purposes of compliance is other than
January 1, 1993, the date specified in the provision.
The avowed purpose of Amendment 73 is to
revitalize government, inhibit voter apathy and
stimulate voter participation and involvement. I can
find no basis for concluding that the electorate
intended to defer those objectives for an additional
six years.
Amendment 73 contains an effective date
and states that none of the State elected officials,
whether executive or legislative, may serve more
than the specified number of terms. It further
proclaims that it is "applicable to all persons
thereafter seeking election." The Ballot Title
contained the same quoted language. The purpose of
the amendment, as stated in its Preamble, is to limit
the terms of elected officials who are described as an
entrenched incumbency who ignore their duties and
are preoccupied with reelection. The language of the
amendment itself read as a whole runs counter to an
interpretation that it is not to take effect, practically
speaking, until 2000 or thereafter.
I do not believe that Amendment 73 is a
retroactive law because the amendment does not take
away a vested right or impose a new obligation,
duty, or disability regarding matters that already
have occurred. F.D.I.C. v. Faulkner, 991 F.2d 262
(5th Cir. 1993), citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 102 L. Ed. 2d 493, 109 S.
Ct. 468 (1988); Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825
F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Ficarra v. Dept. of
Reg. Agencies, 849 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1993). A statute
does not operate retroactively merely because its
application requires some reference to prior facts.
F.D.I.C. v. Faulkner, supra, citing McAndrews v.
Fleet Bank of Massachusetts, 989 F.2d 13 (1st Dir.
1993) [citing Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427 1922, 67 L.
Ed. 332, 43 S. Ct. 154)]. Furthermore, it is clear
that holding public office is a privilege, not a vested
right. Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, supra.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the
majority opinion as to Section I (JUSTICIABILITY),
Section II (ENACTING CLAUSE), Section IV
(SEVERABILITY), and Section V (STATE
OFFICEHOLDERS), but not as to Sections III
(QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSE) and Section VI
(TERMS OF SERVICE COUNTED), to which I
respectfully dissent.
ENDNOTE
1. 1 recognize that Amendment 26 of the United States
Constitution prohibits such an action; however, the actions of
the framers must be examined within the proper context. At
the time the Constitution was ratified, a state could abridge
the right to vote by establishing a property requirement or an
age restriction beyond 18 years of age.
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
ROBERT H. DUDLEY, Associate Justice
I concur in three of the holdings of the
majority opinion, dissent from one, and do not reach
the other two.
I
I concur with the holding that this case
presents a justiciable issue. The petitioners below
sought a judgment declaring that Amendment 73 is
invalid. We have said that a declaratory judgment is
especially appropriate in disputes between private
citizens and public officials about the meaning of the
constitution or statutes. Culp v. Scurlock, 225 Ark.
749, 284 S.W.2d 851 (1955). If, as argued by
intervenors, some state officeholders are illegally
holding office, their salaries would constitute illegal
exactions, and a declaratory judgment action is
appropriate to determine that issue. McDonald v.
Bowen, 250 Ark. 1049, 468 S.W.2d 765 (1971).
Thus, there is a justiciable issue, and a suit for
declaratory judgment is the proper action to
determine the issue.
II
I concur with the holding that Amendment
73, in part, violates the Constitution of the United
States. It does so for three reasons. First, the
framers rejected the idea of term limits in drafting
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the Constitution. Second, allowing a several state to
create qualifications for national officeholders is
antithetical to republican values. Third, the
imposition of term limitations upon members of the
Congress of the United States would violate the
Qualifications Clause of the Constitution because it
would add a qualification--lack of incumbency--to the
requirements that are fixed by the Constitution, and
the several states do not have this power. See Plugge
v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 654, 661, 841 S.W.2d 139,
143 (1992) (Dudley, J., dissenting).
The third reason stated above is a close
question and difficult issue. The articulate dissenting
opinions of Justices Hays and Cracraft cause one to
pause. The argument that a candidate is only barred
from appearing on the ballot, but is not barred as a
write-in candidate, is appealing at first blush, but
when one thinks about it the issue becomes clear
because, as a practical matter, the amendment would
place term limits on service in the Congress. I am
reassured by the style of this case, U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. That name implies just what this
amendment is: A practical limit on the terms of the
members of the Congress. The fact that a person can
conceivably be elected as a write-in candidate does
not vitiate the fact that, as a practical matter,
write-in candidates are at a distinct disadvantage.
The result would be that the Qualifications Clause
would be violated by the amendment.
III
I concur in the holding that the voters of this
State can, by amendment of the state constitution,
limit the terms of state officeholders. There is no
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States because the
state interest of limiting the terms of officeholders
clearly outweighs the burden on the officeholders
and those supporting them. See Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 103 S.
Ct. 1564 (1983).
IV
I dissent from the holding in the plurality
opinion that the provision in the amendment for
limiting the terms of federal officeholders can be
severed from the provision limiting the terms of state
officeholders. This is a state issue and is governed
by state law.
Amendment 73 contains a severability
clause, but that clause alone does not necessarily
determine severability. In Combs v. Glen Falls
Insurance Co., 237 Ark. 745, 375 S.W.2d 809
(1964), we wrote:
A severability clause is frequently
an aid to the Courts in the construction of a
statute, but, in the oft-quoted words of
Justice Brandeis, it is not "an inexorable
command." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S.
286, 68 L. Ed. 686, 44 S. Ct. 323. While
such a clause deserves reasonable
consideration it should not be paid undue
homage. Sutherland, Statutory Construction
(3d Ed.) § 2408. For example, if an act
should levy a new tax and create a new
agency for its collection, no one could doubt
that the invalidation of the tax would also do
away with the collection agency, despite the
presence of a severability clause. In Nixon
v. Allen, 150 Ark. 244, 234 S.W. 45, we
declared an entire act to be invalid, in the
face of such a clause, because we concluded
that if the legislature had known in advance
that part of the act was unconstitutional it
would not have enacted the rest. That is
really the test.
Id. at 747-48, 375 S.W.2d at 810-11 (emphasis
added).
After writing the above, we declared the
entire act void even though the act at issue contained
a severability clause and only part of the act was
invalid. We did so because the "alternatives are
complementary and interdependent." Id. at 748, 375
S.W.2d at 811.
Somewhat like the case at bar, in Allen v.
Langston, 216 Ark. 77, 224 S.W.2d 377 (1949), the
citizens of Lee County passed an initiated motor
vehicle tax act pursuant to Amendment 7, the
initiative amendment. The initiated act authorized a
tax on motor vehicles as well as wagons and
buggies. A part of the tax was for the privilege of
driving motor vehicles on the highways, and we held
that the county's attempt to tax the use of the
highways for motor vehicles was contrary to the
general law of the state and therefore
unconstitutional. However, that part of the act which
taxed wagons and buggies was valid since state law
had not preempted that field. In sum, part of the
initiated act was valid and part of it was invalid. We
held the entire initiated act void "for the reason that
it seemed apparent that the people of Lee County had
no intention of separating and enforcing the
provision as to wagons and buggies in the event the
remaining tax on motor vehicles was declared void
and of no effect." Id. at 85, 224 S.W.2d at 381
(emphasis added).
Likewise, in Wenderoth v. City of Fort
Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971), we
said that when parts of a law are connected and
interwoven, and the legislature intended to enact the
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law as a whole and not in parts, severance is not
appropriate.
In Hasha v. City of Fayetteville, 311 Ark.
460, 845 S.W.2d 500 (1993), the city placed a sales
and use tax proposal on the same ballot as an invalid
proposal to construct school facilities. The invalid
proposal to construct school facilities was a lure to
obtain a favorable vote on the tax. We held
severance was not appropriate because the two
proposals were "inextricably linked" and "tied
together." We wrote: "There was a natural
relationship between them. The two proposals were
part of the same plan. They were united." Id. at 470,
845 S.W.2d at 505. Also, the bonds were "a primary
purpose of the tax." Id., 845 S.W.2d at 506. Both
the dissenting opinion and the dissenting opinion on
rehearing make clear the fact that no evidence was
submitted to support the holding that the voters were
lured into voting for the tax. See 311 Ark. 460, 471,
845 S.W.2d 500, 506 (Glaze, J., dissenting); Hasha
v. City of Fayetteville, 311 Ark. 476, 845 S.W.2d
500-A, 476-C, 847 S.W.2d 41, 42 (1993)
(supplemental opinion denying rehearing) (Glaze, J.,
dissenting). The pertinent questions are whether
there the two proposals were inextricably linked in
the minds of the voters, whether they were tied
together in the minds of the voters, whether the
voters perceived a natural relationship between them,
whether they were presented as being united,
whether the voters had any intention of separating
the proposals and enforcing them separately, and
whether both were a primary purpose of the
amendment. To state the questions is to answer
them. The two proposals were clearly tied together.
They were linked. There was a natural relationship
between them. Limiting the terms of members of
Congress was a primary purpose of the amendment.
Both proposals were sold together as one political
package.
Each ballot cast at the election contained a
ballot title, or summary, of the amendment. The
great majority of voters derived their information
about the amendment from the ballot title. Dust v.
Riviere, 277 Ark. 1, 638 S.W.2d 663 (1982). The
ballot title that the voters read in voting on this
amendment was as follows:
An Amendment to the Constitution
of the State of Arkansas limiting the number
of terms that may be served by the elected
officials of the Executive Department of this
state to two (2) four year terms, this
department to consist of a Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State,
Treasurer of State, Auditor of State,
Attorney General, Commissioner of State
Lands; limiting the number of terms that
may be served by members of the Arkansas
Senate to two (2) four-year terms, these
members to be chosen every four years;
providing that any person having been
elected to three (3) or more terms as a
member of the United States House of
Representatives from Arkansas shall not be
eligible to appear on the ballot for election
to the United States House of
Representatives from Arkansas; providing
that any person having been elected to two
(2) or more terms as a member for the
United States Senate from Arkansas shall
not be eligible to appear on the ballot for
election to the United States Senate from
Arkansas; providing for an effective date of
January 1, 1993; and making the provisions
applicable to all persons thereafter seeking
election to the specified offices.
Before the vote on the amendment was held,
the proponents of the measure were aware of the
problems involved in linking the two measures. In
declining to remove the proposal from the ballot
before the election this court wrote:
Undoubtedly, a strong case can be
made concerning the Term Limitation
Amendment's invalidity both under
Arkansas's and the United States'
Constitutions, and voters should be aware
that their votes for or against this measure
may ultimately have value only as an
expression of public sentiment on the
subject. In short, a future judicial
proceeding will be required to decide the
Amendment's validity if it is adopted by the
people. If that occurs, the constitutional
arguments posited here will then be placed
squarely before us and can be decided after
due and proper consideration.
Plugge v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 654, 661, 841 S.W.2d
139, 143 (1992) (emphasis added).
Undisputedly, the two proposals were
packaged and sold together. One of the proposals is
valid, while the other is unconstitutional. The
proponents of the amendment were aware of the
pending constitutional issue, but they objected to it
being decided before the election. Still, they
continued to sell the proposals together. The majority
opinion severs the two proposals after the election
and declares one of them valid.
The precedent set by the majority opinion
runs counter to the efforts of this court to require
fairness and honesty in the presentation of initiated
proposals to the voters. We have required that ballot
titles be honest and impartial. Dust v. Riviere, 277
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Ark. 1, 638 S.W.2d 663 (1984); Shepherd v.
McDonald, 189 Ark. 29, 70 S.W.2d 566 (1934). We
have mandated that ballot titles fairly assess the
general purpose of the act. Coleman v. Sherrill, 189
Ark. 843, 75 S.W.2d 248 (1934). We have held they
must not be misleading. Westbrook v. McDonald,
184 Ark. 740, 43 S.W.2d 356 (1931).
The troubling aspect of the precedent set by
the case at bar is illustrated by the case of Hoban v.
Hall, 229 Ark. 416, 316 S.W.2d 185 (1958). It that
case we ordered a proposal removed from the ballot
before the people voted on it, and, to that extent it is
not applicable, but it is applicable to demonstrate
how some people will attempt to bait a proposed
amendment. The proponents of the initiated
amendment named their proposal "The States' Rights
Amendment" since that was a popular concept in the
South at the time. However, the ballot title failed to
disclose that the amendment would create a
commission with overreaching authority. It could
conduct investigations and conduct public or secret
hearings and "interrogate any citizen in the state
about his business affairs, his private life, his
political beliefs, or any other subject that can be
imagined." Id. at 420, 316 S.W.2d at 187. If a
public official failed to carry out "the clear
mandates" of the amendment, he was subject to a
fine, imprisonment, and automatic forfeiture of
office. Id. In removing the proposal from the ballot
because the proponents only disclosed the bait of
states' rights, we wrote:
The cause of states' rights, like that
of the aged and the blind, is deservedly a
popular one and undeniably appeals to the
great body of the electorate. But are there
provisions in the amendment which, if made
known, would give the voter serious ground
for reflection?
Id. at 418, 316 S.W. 2d at 187.
We did not allow the misleading political
packaging.
The majority opinion does not fully address
political packaging and the questionable precedent.
Rather, it misses the mark and concentrates on
whether the two proposals can be said to literally
stand independently.
In summary, I concur in holding that the
part of Amendment 73 which is in violation of the
Constitution of the United States is void, and that
part which limits the terms of state officeholders is
valid. I would hold that in the minds of the voters
the invalid part of the amendment was inextricably
linked with the valid part, and, as a result, I would
not allow the two proposals to be severed after the
election. Consequently, I would hold that
Amendment 73 is void.
V
Since I would hold that Amendment 73 is
void for the reasons set out above, I do not reach the
issues regarding the enacting clause and terms of
service counted.
CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN
PART.
GERALD P. BROWN, SPECIAL JUSTICE
The enactment clause issue, which has
assumed a curious prominence in this drama, is in
reality a petition-sufficiency issue over which this
court has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Ark.
Const. amend. 7. Since the trial court based its
ruling on that issue, we would ordinarily dispose of
it on procedural grounds. Under the circumstances of
this case, I do not believe that such a disposition
would be in the public interest in as much as the
enactment clause issue (along with several others)
was raised in this court in a pre-election challenge.
We declined to decide this issue at that time for the
reasons set forth in Plugge v. McCuen, 310 Ark.
654, 841 S.W.2d 139 (1992). I agree with the
majority's decision to address the enactment clause
issue at this time and dispose of it on its merits.
I also agree with the majority opinion that
Amendment 73 is not vulnerable to attack on the
enactment clause ground. In the first place, I do not
believe that Amendment 7 requires a constitutional
amendment to contain an enactment clause. Even if
it does, Amendment 73 substantially complies.
The initiative petition, which placed
Amendment 73 on the ballot, begins, "We, the
undersigned legal voters of the State of Arkansas,
respectfully propose the following Amendment to the
Constitution of the State of Arkansas . . ." and ends,
"and by this, our petition order that the same be
submitted to the people of said state, to the end that
the same may be adopted, enacted, or rejected by the
vote of legal voters of said state. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied.) That does not leave much room for doubt
that the voters knew that they were enacting a new
law. No one has suggested that the absence of the
words "Be it Enacted" misled anyone or had any
effect on the outcome of the election. To strike down
Amendment 73 for want of a formal enactment
clause, after it has been approved by sixty percent of
the voters, would be unduly technical and would
elevate form over substance.
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I agree with the majority opinion which
holds that section 3 of Amendment 73 is fatally
flawed because it conflicts with Supremacy Clause
and the Qualification Clauses of the United States
Constitution.
Although the issue is not entirely free from
doubt, I believe the founding fathers considered and
rejected term limits for members of Congress at the
time of the adoption of the United States Constitution
by the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
over two hundred years ago. [See authorities
discussed in majority opinion and the dissenting
opinion in Plugge v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 654, 841
S.W.2d 139 (1992).]
As the majority opinion recognizes, and
Justice Hays forcefully argues in his dissenting
opinion, whether the founding fathers intended to
foreclose the states from imposing additional
qualifications for Congressmen was not definitively
and categorically settled. In fact, Justice Hays makes
a strong case for "minimum" rather than "exclusive"
qualifications. But the action finally taken by the
framers of the constitution, following exhaustive
debates, is strong evidence that term limits for
senators and representatives was rejected. Certainly
that is the most plausible interpretation; and the
specter of the hodge-podge of qualifications which a
contrary holding might engender is daunting enough
to swing the balance.
Congressional officeholders partake of the
same national character as the President of the
United States. Members of Congress pass laws which
affect not only their own state, but all the states.
They are part of the national team which was created
by the Continental Congress. The rules which govern
their qualifications are contained in the Constitution
of the United States. Uniformity of qualifications is
paramount, and individual states are not free to
engraft variations. The terms for members of
Congress can be limited only by amending the
United States Constitution.
Does the constitutional infirmity of section
3 vitiate the entire amendment, or is the serum
provided by the severability clause strong enough to
prevent the spread of the infection?
In Combs v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 237 Ark.
745, 375 S.W.2d 809 (1964), this court held that the
test of the efficacy of a severability clause is whether
the measure would have passed without the
unconstitutional portion.
There is no way for this court to determine
whether the voters would have approved term limits
for state officeholders if section 3 had not been in
the picture. The sponsors of Amendment 73 created
this uncertainty and, therefore, had the onus to
furnish this court something to go on besides
speculation. There is nothing in the record to show
that this dichotomous issue was explained to the
voters in a meaningful way. In short, there was not
a straightforward, up-or-down vote on term limits
for state officeholders.
There can be no serious doubt that a state
has plenary power to impose term limits on state
officials, provided it is accomplished in a
constitutionally permissible manner. The sponsors of
Amendment 73 obviously knew that section 3 was of
questionable constitutionality because of the different
approach they used: ballot access. They knew that
most of the public discussion of term limits had been
in the context of congressional officeholders. When
they chose to blanket the two groups (state and
federal officeholders) into one unified package, the
voters had no choice to approve one without the
other. The two groups were not only inextricably
linked - they were systemically fused in such a
manner that each ceased to have a separate existence
for voting purposes. Although section 3 is couched
in ballot-access terminology, the distinction between
outright bar and ballot-access is too fine a point for
the average voter to grasp.
The practice of coupling a legitimate
objective with one of doubtful legality, papered over
with a severability clause, is not fair to voters. It is
misleading at the very least, if not downright
deceptive, and should be discouraged. We should
make it clear to sponsors of constitutional
amendments and initiated acts that they are skating
on thin ice when they rely on the redemptive power
of a severability clause to bail out a shaky joinder.
Such a posture will promote truth-in-packaging and
thus be voter-friendly.
While "The States' Rights Amendment"
involved in Hoban v. Hall, 229 Ark. 416, 316
S.W.2d 185 (1958), discussed at length in Justice
Dudley's dissent 'herein, is admittedly an extreme
example, it is illustrative of an effort to couple a
legitimate public concern with a less laudable
objective, with potential far-reaching consequences.
The court simply ignored the severability clause in
Hoban and treated it as a ballot title issue rather than
a severability clause issue. Of course, those are
separate issues, but they have in common the
potential for unfairness to voters.
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Amendment 73 were
presented to the voters as an "all or nothing"
package. State and federal officials were lumped
together and referred to in the Preamble as "elected
officials." Section 6 stated that the provisions of
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Amendment 73 shall be applicable to "the offices
specified in this Amendment." The offices specified
are state and federal officeholders.
Since section 3 cannot pass constitutional
muster, sections 1 and 2 must also fall.
I respectfully dissent from the majority
holding that the severability clause saved sections 1
and 2.
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TERM LIMITS FACE DAY OF RECKONING
Copyright 1994 Roll Call Associates
Roll Call
June 23, 1994
Susan B. Glasser
Congress's seniority system and the future of
much-derided "professional politicians" will be on
the line with this week's Supreme Court decision to
settle once and for all whether term limits for
Members are constitutional.
On Monday, the Court decided to hear two
consolidated lawsuits challenging Arkansas's
term-limits law, passed in 1992 along with similar
initiatives in 13 other states.
So far, two state supreme courts - in
Arkansas and Nebraska - have invalidated term limits
on Members of Congress, as has a federal district
court in Washington state.
But the US Supreme Court has never
weighed in on a constitutional question that has had
far-reaching political implications since the
movement for term limits first exploded nationwide
in 1990 with Colorado's move to restrict the tenure
of its federal officeholders.
Dueling legal precedents will provide much
of the drama in the Supreme Court's consideration of
the Arkansas case.
Opponents of term limits rely on Powell v.
McCormack, the 1969 case in which the Court ruled
that the three qualifications for sitting in Congress
spelled out in the Constitution - age, citizenship, and
residency - cannot be expanded; backers of term
limits cite Storer v. Brown, a 1974 case in which the
Court upheld California ballot access restrictions,
citing the constitutional clause that allows states to
regulate the "time, places, and manner" of federal
elections.
The decision by the Supreme Court to take
the case was greeted with relief by both sides of the
term-limits controversy, with such opponents as
Speaker Tom Foley (D-Wash) insisting all along that
the courts are the proper forum for deciding the
question and supporters countering that it only boosts
the momentum behind their drive.
"The Speaker has long felt this represents
one of the major constitutional issues of the decade,"
said Jeff Biggs, spokesman for Foley, whose own
lawsuit against Washington's term limits is being
appealed. "Both
development."
sides should applaud this
Said Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill), the only
Member of Congress in either party actually to file
a brief backing Foley's lawsuit, "Let's have at it."
And Paul Jacob, executive director of U.S.
Term Limits, a national term-limits group that has
intervened to defend the Arkansas term limits, said,
"We're going to the legal big leagues. It will be nice
to have one main case instead of many, many cases. "
The Supreme Court's move, which sets the
stage for oral arguments in its fall term and a
decision within a year from now, comes at a time
when term limits have become a more potent
political force. "It's such a tremendous movement,"
said Deborah La Fetra of the Pacific Legal
Foundation. "So the issue wasn't going to go away."
Term limits regularly receive 70 percent or
higher support in opinion polls. Several more states
- including Maine, Oklahoma, Nevada,
Massachusetts, and possibly others - are expected to
vote on Congressional limits this fall, and U.S. Term
Limits has signaled its intention to enter more
directly into House elections this year through an
aggressive radio and direct mail "voter education"
effort on behalf of pro-limits candidates.
There is also a strongly partisan flavor to the
term-limits politics as Republican challengers are
poised to make major gains against Democratic
incumbents in this fall's elections, many of them
using term limits as a major weapon in the arsenal of
anti-incumbency.
"I think people in Congress have been
looking for cover legally," said Jacob. "I think
they're wrong. I think they'll have a rude awakening
on November 8 if they're not good on term limits."
Those political realities were reflected on
Capitol Hill in the aftermath of the Court's decision
Monday to take the Arkansas case. A group of six
Republican Members of Congress, led by California
Rep. Bob Dornan, quickly sent out a Dear Colleague
seeking Congressional signers for an amicus curiae
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brief by the conservative Washington Legal
Foundation supporting term limits.
And backers like Rep. Tillie Fowler (R-Fla),
who intervened to defend Florida's term-limit law in
a lawsuit last year, sent out press releases extolling
the Supreme Court's move.
Opponents, however, were far less visible -
as they have been throughout the debate - and Biggs
said this week there had been "no discussion" yet of
any amicus brief by Congressional term-limits
opponents.
The Arkansas cases the Supreme Court will
decide, known as U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton
and Bryant v. Hill, dispute the constitutionality of
Arkansas's Initiative 73, which forbids the state's
House Members from being on the ballot after six
consecutive years in office and the state's Senators
from the ballot after 12 years.
The measure passed with 60 percent in
November 1992, but this year the state Supreme
Court voted 7 to 2 against the measure, saying that
only a constitutional amendment could require term
limits on Members. "If there is one watchword for
representation of the various States in Congress, it is
uniformity," wrote Justice Robert Brown in the
majority opinion.
But term-limit supporters said the record in
the Arkansas case was actually better for them than
that in the Washington case, where US District Judge
William Dwyer this winter issued a stinging 75-page
opinion attacking term limits for not only violating
the Constitution's qualifications clause but also for
encroaching on the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of incumbents.
The two dissenters in the Arkansas Supreme
Court agreed with term-limit backers that
qualifications for office weren't really the issue at
all, since a longtime incumbent could still win
re-election as a write-in candidate.
Wrote Justice Steele Hays, "While it is clear
that the framers discussed term limits, I am not
convinced that the failure to include term limits in
the Constitution prohibits the people of the states
from enacting term limits."
Behind the scenes, there are several
interesting legal twists to the Arkansas case.
First, all of the state's six Members of
Congress were named as defendants in the case when
it was originally filed by Bobbie Hill, an official of
the state League of Women Voters.
Since virtually all of the incumbents oppose
term limits (and Democratic Sen. Dale Bumpers used
the Senate Counsel to argue that state-imposed term
limits are unconstitutional), that was widely
interpreted as a move to prompt a less than vigorous
defense of the law.
Second, rivalry within the term-limits
movement has spilled over into the legal
maneuvering surrounding the Arkansas and
Washington cases. U.S. Term Limits became the
first intervenor in the Arkansas case, ensuring the
organization's name would become the case name,
while in Washington the group wasn't as actively
involved.
In fact, U.S. Term Limits filed a motion
opposing the move to allow the Washington case to
skip the appeals court and move directly to the
Supreme Court, where it could be consolidated with
the Arkansas case. The Supreme Court decided
Monday that shouldn't happen, but other term-limits
supporters were critical of U.S. Term Limits.
"I would prefer to have seen both of them
reviewed," said Paul Kamenar of the Washington
Legal Foundation. "One provision might change one
vote to change the whole case."
For example, he noted, Arkansas's law says
that a House Member who serves three consecutive
terms in office would be forever barred from being
on the ballot, while in Washington a six-year House
veteran is merely barred from the ballot for the next
election cycle.
"That might be cause for some concern
among one or more justices," Kamenar said.
But U.S. Term Limits's Jacob said, "I think
the Arkansas case is a better case. The wording of
the ballot access restriction and write-in capability is
more clear, better drafted. And the court in ruling
against us better dealt with some of the issues."
And since the Supreme Court has decided
that the Arkansas case will be the case, there's not
much term-limit supporters can do about it anyway.
All of them insist opponents have been overconfident
they will prevail in the Supreme Court.
"When you look at the ballot access cases
from the last decade," La Fetra said, "they do really
seem to defer to the states. And when they look at
Arkansas's law, which was specifically drafted as a
ballot access measure, I'm confident they will uphold
it as constitutional."
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Even La Fetra, however, cautioned that it
will take "a lot of courage" on the part of the
lifetime-appointed Justices to decide to force their
legislative branch colleagues out of work.
Meanwhile, the debate inside Congress goes
on even as the high-stakes legal waiting continues.
On June 29 the Hill will have its own airing of the
term-limits controversy, when the House Judiciary
subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights holds
its long-awaited second hearing on the matter.
The panel, chaired by term-limits foe Rep.
Don Edwards (D-Calif), last fall held the first-ever
House hearing on term limits after freshman
reformers in both parties launched a high-profile
campaign for them. Next week's hearing will feature
testimony from columnist George Will, who favors
term limits, and others on both sides.
As Hyde, ranking member of the panel said,
"An awful lot of sound and fury is being expended
on referenda and plebiscites and all of that....
There's revenue to be gained, there are computer
letters to be generated, and that will go on. I don't
think this will slow down the term-limits people."
Reprinted by permission of the author and by
permission of Roll Call.
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CONGRESSIONAL ELIGIBILITY TESTED
High Court to Rule on Term Limits
Copyright 1994 Bergen Record Corp.
The Record
June 21, 1994; Tuesday; All Editions
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder News Service
For several years now, they have
campaigned under such names as "Throw the Rascals
Out," "LIMIT," and "Eight is Enough." And despite
legal clouds, they have succeeded in persuading
voters in 15 states to curb the number of terms of
members of Congress.
Their campaign, in fact, may be "the most
significant grass-roots political phenomenon of recent
years," as lawyers for U.S. Term Limits describe it.
On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
for the first time to determine the constitutionality of
one method of restricting the number of times a
member of Congress may be reelected.
The test case comes from Arkansas, where
a 1992 amendment to the state constitution forbids
printing on ballots the names of U.S. senators who
have served 12 years and House members in office
six years.
They may run for reelection as write-in
candidates, however.
"The people of Arkansas find and declare
that elected officials who remain in office too long
become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their
duties as representatives of the people," the
amendment proclaims.
But it, as well as term-limit measures in
Washington and Nebraska, have been struck down in
court this year.
Supporters of term limits argue that longtime
incumbents serve the narrow interests of their
contributors, have an unfair advantage in elections,
and lessen competition for their offices.
Critics contend that limiting the tenure of
officeholders is undemocratic, downgrades the
importance of legislative experience, deprives the
public of representation by worthy incumbents, and
is largely a conservative drive aimed at crippling
Democratic control of Congress.
The Supreme Court case, expected to be
resolved next year, will focus on whether the
Arkansas term-limits amendment violates the first
article of the U.S. Constitution.
Article I lists qualifications for members of
Congress. A member of the House of
Representatives must be at least 25 years old and a
U.S. citizen for seven years. A senator must be at
least 30 and a U.S. citizen for nine years. Both
senators and House members must be residents of
the states that elected them.
Authorities generally agree that Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and other founders
rejected term limits in drafting the Constitution.
What Arkansas did, according to its highest
court, was add a new limitation to the age,
nationality, and residency requirements prescribed by
the Constitution.
"Term limitations for congressional
representation may well have come of age ," wrote
Arkansas Associate Justice Robert L. Brown. "But
to institute such a change, an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution is required, ratified by three-fourths of
the states."
But dissenting judges argued that Article I
was intended to prescribe the minimum
qualifications, not the only ones, and that the state
amendment doesn't prevent incumbents from being
reelected but "merely makes it more difficult."
"Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed
that government is an experiment," Arkansas Justice
Steele Hays wrote. "The people are the conductors
of that endless experiment and have the right to
tinker with it as they choose, free of unwarranted
interference. "
A key precedent arose from the refusal of
the House of Representatives to seat reelected Rep.
Adam Clayton Powell, D-N.Y., for improperly
diverting federal money to his wife, his staff, and
himself.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1969 that
Congress could not exclude any elected member of
Congress for any reason other than the qualifications
listed in the Constitution.
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The ruling in the Powell case is fatal to
congressional term limits, argue the League of
Women Voters and opponents of the Arkansas
amendment.
But Arkansas Attorney General Winston
Bryant, a Democrat, disagreed.
He told the Supreme Court that the Powell
ruling doesn't restrict the power of the states to
break up "modern-day legislative fiefdoms that...
render the political process unresponsive to the
electorate."
In petitioning the high court for review,
Bryant said that during the last two decades,
"congressional incumbents have been reelected at an
unprecedented, and, to some, alarming, rate."
At least 90 percent of all incumbents seeking
reelection from 1974 to 1990 won, according to the
petition.
Senators serve six-year terms; House
members serve two-year terms.
The 15 states with restrictions on multiterm
congressional incumbents are Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. Similar
proposals are expected to appear on November
ballots in seven additional states: Alaska, Idaho,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, and
Utah.
Reprinted by permission: Tribune Media
Services
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GOVERNMENT LTD.
High Court Takes a Look at Term Limits
Copyright 1994 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune
June 26, 1994 Sunday, Chicagoland Final Edition
Vincent J. Schodolski, a member of the Tribune's West Coast bureau
Four years after angry voters began
endorsing term limits in a wave of ballot initiatives,
the U.S. Supreme Court last week agreed to accept
a case that is expected to quickly resolve what has
become a high-stakes national political debate.
At issue is whether states can impose limits
on the number of times U.S. Senate and House
members can run for re-election or if the
qualifications for office that are chiseled into the
nation's Constitution-age, residency, citizenship-can
be altered only by amendment.
From Arkansas to Washington, voters have
gone to the polls eager to limit incumbency-usually
to two six-year terms for senators and three two-year
terms for House members-in what generally has been
portrayed as a frustrated backlash by those who view
Congress as ineffective and out of touch.
Since 1990 voters in 15 states have adopted
initiatives that set term limits for Congress members
and, in some cases, state officials.
Seven more states, including Illinois, are
expected to have similar initiatives on the ballot in
November.
So with an increasingly crowded bandwagon
headed down what might be a constitutionally bumpy
road, the Supreme Court agreed with unusual speed
to hear an appeal of an Arkansas Supreme Court
ruling last March that struck down term limits
approved by voters there.
Experts think the high court moved quickly
because of the number of states that in just four
years were taking action on laws that could be
constitutionally questionable.
"I assume they took it (the Arkansas case)
because they realized that this issue was popping up
in about half of the states and that it is not going to
go away," said James Pharris, a Washington state
assistant attorney general. "This is a major national
issue."
Pharris argued Washington's case in favor of
term limits when a 1992 voter-approved law was
challenged in federal court and ultimately ruled
unconstitutional.
The first state to adopt term limits was
Colorado in 1990. The next year, Washington
rejected a ballot initiative on the subject, only to
have 60 percent of voters approve a reworded
version in 1992.
Now on appeal in the U.S. Ninth Circuit,
the Washington law, like the Arkansas legislation,
limited the number of terms senators and
representatives could serve to two and three
respectively. The Washington law takes effect in
1998.
And like the Arkansas law, the Washington
initiative said anyone who had served his allotted
time in Congress still could run as a write-in
candidate but could not appear on the printed ballot.
In the view of those opposed to term limits,
the initiatives sweeping the nation are ill advised and
almost certainly unconstitutional.
"We think that the Constitution is the wisest
way of structuring our government," said Fredric
Tausend, who was the attorney for the League of
Women Voters in their suit challenging the
Washington law. Fourteen-term Rep. Tom Foley
(D-Wash.), the House speaker, joined the suit.
Ironically, under the Articles of
Confederation that preceded the adoption of the
Constitution, term limits did apply.
They were eliminated during debate at the
Constitutional Convention, which established the
criteria for holding office in Congress based on
minimum age, length of U.S. citizenship and time of
residency in a particular state.
In arguing against the Washington law,
attorneys said the state's initiative had violated
aspects of the 1st and 14th Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution, namely freedom of speech and the right
of free association.
Kevin Hamilton, an attorney for the
American Civil Liberties Union, said that in 1992
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voters in Seattle's 5th Congressional District went
against the tide and opposed term limits, while at the
same time returning their multiterm
congressman-Speaker Foley-to office.
"The voters of the state of Washington were
trying to tell the voters of the 5th District that they
could not have the representative they wanted,"
Hamilton said. "From the ACLU's point of view that
is outrageous."
He said the Washington law also could
deprive political parties of nominating the candidates
they wanted for office and giving them the added
endorsement of appearing on the printed ballot.
Norman Leahy is research director for the
Washington D.C.-based U.S. Term Limits, a
national lobby group that has sponsored term-limit
voter initiatives around the country.
He said that his organization believed that a
constitutional amendment was the best way to deal
with the issue of term limits but felt it could never
get Congress to act on this.
"We would love to have a constitutional
amendment but realistically we know that we would
never get an amendment out of Congress," Leahy
said. "There is nothing in this for them."
He admitted reluctantly that forcing out
worthy incumbents through strict term limits could
potentially damage the Congress.
"Perhaps in the short run people would miss
the skills of experienced lawmakers," he said. "But
in a nation of 250 million people, we can surely find
535 people who can do the job."
And he saw a much more basic issue at
stake.
"When you talk about federalism, this case
is it," Leahy said. "This is the people and the states
trying to shape the federal system. It pits the interest
of the people against the ruling class and goes to the
question of who really runs this country."
U.S. Term Limits approaches the issue from
a particular perspective. The organization was
established in 1992 by New York businessman
Howard Rich, who paid $10,000 for the
assets-primarily the mailing list-of a bankrupt
organization called Americans to Limit
Congressional Terms.
Rich is a former official of the Libertarian
Party and has staffed his new organization in part
with Libertarians, who share a political belief in
absolute minimalist government.
Leahy said U.S. Term Limits currently has
50,000 members who pay basic dues of $15 a year.
He said the group has other members who routinely
make donations "in excess of $1,000" but he refused
to name them.
In the past, conservative business interests
like the oil and gas Koch family in Topeka, which
runs the second-largest family-owned business in the
U.S., have contributed heavily to groups pressing for
term limits, something that worries those opposed to
them.
Margaret Colony, former Washington state
president of the League of Women Voters, said the
league's opposition to the state's term limit law was
based in part on the belief that it would limit the
power of Congress and throw off the balance of
power between the legislative and executive
branches.
But even more ominous, she said, was the
challenge to the federal system, one that left it more
vulnerable to the influence of congressional staff
members and lobbyists for special interests-neither
group accountable to voters.
"New people tend to depend on those who
have been around longer, on staff and lobbyists,"
Colony said. "It is easy for unscrupulous people to
take power in any system. This becomes more
dangerous when people who have not been elected
have increased powers."
Colony also saw the drive for short-term
solutions as an example of increasing American
political myopia.
"There is no quick fix that will guarantee
good government," she said. "This (term limits) is
just a gimmick.
"Of course there are problems with long
incumbency, but we think the real way to get at the
frustration of voters . . . is to change the way we
fund election campaigns. I'm not hopeful that just by
bringing new people into office we will get better
government."
Attorney Tausend put it another way:
"Voters already have an alternative. They can just
vote to throw the rascals out."
Reprinted with permission.
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The U.S. Supreme Court's announcement
June 20 that it will rule on congressional term limits
will accelerate a process that has been growing
strong since 1990, when Colorado became the first
state to limit the terms of its members of Congress.
At issue is the Arkansas Supreme Court's
decision voiding a referendum, approved by 60
percent of state voters, to limit their members of the
U.S. House of Representatives to three terms and
members of the Senate to two terms. That court said
the U.S. Constitution does not permit states or
citizens to add "qualifications" to members of
Congress.
In a strong dissent, Justice Steele Hays
wrote: "I start from the premise that all political
authority resides in the people, limited only by those
provisions of the federal or state constitutions
specifically to the contrary.
"The only 'intent' that can be ascertained
from the framers' exclusion of term limits is that the
delegates considered it undesirable to impose a
uniform tenure limitation upon the representatives of
every state. However, this does not confirm that the
people of each state are prohibited from enacting
term limits."
The term-limit movement has had broad
support and much success. In states that have had
term-limit initiatives on the ballot, the proposals have
won with an average of 66 percent of the vote. In
1992, term limits received more votes in the 14
states that had referendums than Bill Clinton
received nationwide.
State and local term limits are as important
as congressional ones. In California, the Los
Angeles Times reports, races are more competitive
than ever. An even playing field grants opportunites
to more women and minorities to run for office. In
Texas, Houston council member Sheila Lee, facing
a limit on her local term of office, ran against
incumbent Rep. Craig Washington in the
Democratic primary and won handily. She said she
would have not run for higher office without the
term limit. In Prince George's County, limits on the
County Council persuaded member Frank Casula to
run for - and win - the office of mayor of Laurel.
University of Oklahoma political scientist
David Rausch has identified five very different types
of citizens who support term limits:
* Progressives. "Term limits will decrease
the amount of corruption in government."
* Populists (like Perot supporters). "A
citizen legislature is more representative and
responsive than a professionalized
legislature."
* Classical Republicans. "Term limits will
create legislative bodies which are less likely
to be pulled by the whims of the electorate;
term limits will insulate legislators from the
public and that is good" (expressed by
George Will in his book "Restoration").
* Partisan Republicans. "Term limits will
end Democratic control of legislatures."
* Libertarians. "Term limits will make
government smaller and less expensive."
In Virginia, the idea of term limits has
multipartisan support. State Sen. Virgil H. Goode
Jr., Rocky Mount Democrat, supports term limits.
So do Delegates Frank Ruff, Clarksville Republican,
and Jay Katzen, Warrenton Republican.
Republican congressional candidates Kyle
McSlarrow (8th District) and George Landrith (5th
District) favor limits, as do Libertarian candidates
Bob Rilee (10th District) and Gordon Cruickshank
(11th District).
limits.
Gov. George Allen also supports term
Currently, all Virginia elected officials
except the governor can serve lifetime terms. This
is wrong. Politics should not be a career; it should
be a temporary public service.
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For this reason, we should limit the
governor, lieutenant governor and attorney general
to no more than two terms - eight years - each. At
the same time, we should limit state senators to two
terms (eight years) and members of the House of
Delegates to four terms (eight years), for a total
career in the General Assembly of 16 years.
Similarly, Virginia should follow the lead of 16 other
states and limit our U.S. representatives to three
terms and our U.S. senators to two terms.
Rotation in office was the experience and the
intention of the founders. They viewed public service
as a burden to be endured, not a career for personal
enrichment, influence expansion and power
enhancement.
Term-limit initiatives will be on the ballot in
eight states this year. They will succeed because
voters know that by limiting politicians' terms,
people retake the power that rightfully belongs to
them.
Virginians need to lobby our delegates and
state senators to limit their own terms. If elected
representatives care about their constituents and the
integrity of the commonwealth, they will do so.
Regardless of what the U.S. Supreme Court
decides in Arkansas vs. Hill, the time for term
limits has come. A constitutional amendment
permitting states to limit the terms of their
congressional representatives is in the cards. The
only question is: "How soon?"
Richard Sincere of Arlington, a public relations
consultant, is chairman of Virginians for Term
Limits.
Reprinted from The Washington Times.
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